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COMMENT
DEFINING THE RIGHT TO DIE
DAVID M. ENGLISH*
Many die too late, and few die too early. The doctrine still sounds
strange: "Die at the right time!"1
Although Friedrich Nietzsche was not noted for his views on medical ethics,
the above quotation captures the essence of James Lindgren's article.2 Lindgren
posits that the recent O'Connor' and Cruzan4 decisions signal a shift in the law
on the withdrawal or withholding of treatment. He concludes that the
requirement set forth in those cases-that an individual must have clearly and
convincingly expressed his or her wishes before treatment can be terminat-
ed--errs unduly on the side of life. Basing his conclusion primarily on
preferences revealed by public opinion polls, he contends that a better rule
would be to presume, subject to proof otherwise, that an individual desires death
when the individual falls into one or more of fourteen specified categories.5
Lindgren's arguments have considerable appeal. As his excellent compilation
of polls reveal, a substantial majority of individuals would prefer that life
supports be withdrawn in the event of a terminal illness or irreversible coma.
Yet, only a tiny minority have executed an advance directive with regard to their
future care,6 and a majority have not otherwise made their views known.7
Lindgren overstates his case, however. His conclusion that O'Connor and
Cruzan represent a change in direction is incorrect. Furthermore, while
presumed intent should play a role in the formulation of a rule on the
termination of treatment, it should not be made the exclusive test.
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1. Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: First Part, in THE PORTABLE NIETZSCHE 183
(Walter Kaufmann ed., 1954).
2. James Lindgren, Death By Default, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 185 (Summer 1993).
3. In re Westchester County Medical Center on behalf of O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d 607 (N.Y. 1988).
4. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988), affid sub nom Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept.
of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
5. For the categories, see Lindgren, supra note 2, at 228-29.
6. The results of a recent North Carolina survey are striking. Of 75 nursing home residents
interviewed, 65 expressed a desire to have treatment withdrawn under at least some circumstances, but
none had executed a living will. Elizabeth R. Gamble, Penelope J. McDonald & Peter R. Lichstein,
Knowledge, Attitudes, and Behavior of Elderly Persons Regarding Living Wills, 151 ARCHIVES INTERNAL
MED. 277 (1991).
7. The results of a recent New York nursing home survey are similarly striking. Of 103 residents
interviewed, 62 had not discussed their feelings about future care with anyone. Jiska Cohen-Mansfield
et al., The Decision to Execute a Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care and Preferences Regarding
the Utilization of Life-Sustaining Treatments in Nursing Home Residents, 151 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED.
289, 291 (1991).
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Although Lindgren states that "[t]here are almost as many appellate
approaches to withdrawing life-sustaining treatment as there are appellate
cases, ' in reality there are only two main approaches. Cruzan and O'Connor
represent the extreme. Other courts have not been so restrictive. Like Cruzan
and O'Connor, they recognize clear and convincing evidence of an individual's
prior express wishes as a standard, but, absent such evidence, treatment also may
be withheld or withdrawn under either a substituted judgment9 or best interests
test.1° Furthermore, since the Supreme Court's decision in Cruzan, there is
little evidence of a retreat from this more liberal approach. Florida" and
Illinois 2 have reconfirmed their approval of the substituted judgment test, and
Indiana has allowed the withdrawal of treatment from an individual who never
had the capacity to express her views on the subject. 3
Despite the liberality of a majority of the courts, one cannot conclude that
the results are totally satisfactory. The express wishes standard, as applied, has
been too restrictive. Patients who have met this standard have generally made
their views known only following the onset of a terminal illness, 4 or under
circumstances where their professional training and background added extra
credibility to their statements.1 5 Statements made without such a clear focus or
added authority have generally been held insufficient.16
8. Lindgren, supra note 2, at 188.
9. The substituted judgment test requires that the surrogate decisionmaker attempt to ascertain
the decision that the patient would have made had the patient been competent to decide.
10. For a comprehensive discussion of the judicially created standards for the withdrawal or
withholding of treatment, see ALAN MEISEL, THE RIGHT TO DIE § 9.1-.35 (1989 & 1992 Supp.) There
are variations, to be sure. Florida, for example, recognizes substituted judgment, but has rejected a best
interests approach. See In re Browning, 543 So. 2d 258, 273 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989), affd, 568 So. 2d
4 (Fla. 1990). New Jersey has come up with its own formulation for conscious individuals who will die
within a year or less. Treatment may be withheld or withdrawn under either a "subjective," "limited-
objective," or "objective" test. The subjective test is the same as express wishes, however, and the
objective is the same as best interests, at least as applied in some states. Only the limited-objective test
stakes out new ground. While substituted judgment is the primary criteria, treatment may only be
withheld or withdrawn if the burdens of treatment markedly outweigh the benefits. See In re Conroy,
486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985).
11. In In re Browning, 568 So. 2d at 17, the court approved the enforcement of a living will. While
a living will might be said to be clear and convincing evidence of an individual's express wishes, the court
approved the withdrawal of treatment pursuant to a substituted judgment standard.
12. In re Estate of Greenspan, 558 N.E.2d 1194 (I11. 1990). The importance of Estate of Greenspan,
however, is undercut somewhat by the fact that it was decided only 14 days after the Supreme Court's
decision in Cruzan and failed to cite the Supreme Court's opinion.
13. In re Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d 32 (Ind. 1991). Lawrance is especially significant because it is the
first Indiana appellate court case to address termination of treatment.
14. See Couture v. Couture, 549 N.E.2d 571, 576 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989); Leach v. Akron General
Medical Center, 426 N.E.2d 809, 815 (Ohio C.P. 1980).
15. See In re Eichner, 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y. 1981) (member of religious order expressed views on
use of respirator following seminar on Quinlan and later reiterated views immediately prior to surgery);
McConnell v. Beverly Enterprises-Connecticut, Inc., 553 A.2d 596 (Conn. 1989) (head nurse and manager
of emergency room repeatedly told family and co-workers that she did not want to be kept alive by
artificial means, including by a feeding tube).
16. See Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 411,424; In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434,443 (N.J. 1987); In re O'Connor,
531 N.E.2d at 613. Maine is the exception. See In re Swan, 569 A.2d 1202 (Me. 1990); In re Gardner,
534 A.2d 947 (Me. 1987).
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Substituted judgment has not fared much better. It has been inappropriately
applied to infants and to never-competent adults, 7 whose personal values are
purely speculative. There is no agreement on the relevant factors. 8 Conse-
quently, it provides little guidance on how to infer the patient's choice.' 9
Furthermore, the limited number of empirical studies raise questions as to the
accuracy of the surrogate decisionmakers' predictions.2
The best interests test has played a clearly subordinate role. No consensus
exists as to what is meant by "best interests," but there are some emerging
trends. One approach has been to balance the burdens of treatment against its
expected benefits, although that has proven unworkable when applied to
permanently unconscious patients.21 The test has been applied to require that
a guardian follow his or her own conception of the ward's best interests,
following consideration of all available information, including the ward's prior
statements.22 It has been stated that best interests should be based on societal
norms,23 or should reflect the decision of a hypothetical reasonable person.24
Lindgren would reverse the present system. Instead of requiring a showing
that treatment should be discontinued under an express wishes, substituted
judgment, or best interests theory, he lists fourteen situations where a presump-
tion of nontreatment would apply,25 although, for purposes of the present
discussion, they will be reduced to four:
17. See In re Barry, 445 So. 2d 365 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (infant); Custody of a Minor, 434
N.E.2d 601 (Mass. 1982) (infant); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d
417 (Mass. 1977) (never-competent adult).
18. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 432, which first adopted the test in a termination of treatment context,
listed five factors. Alan Meisel, from his review of the case law, has uncovered 16 more. MEISEL, supra
note 10, § 9.13. Judge Hancock of the New York Court of Appeals has opined that "no exhaustive list
can be set forth." O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d at 617 (Hancock, J., concurring).
19. This argument has been most forcefully made in Rebecca S. Dresser & John A. Robertson,
Quality of Life and Non-Treatment Decisions for Incompetent Patients: A Critique of the Orthodox
Approach, 17 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 234 (1989).
20. See Richard F. Uhlmann et al., Physicians' and Spouses' Predictions of Elderly Patients'
Resuscitation Preferences, 43 J. GERONTOLOGY Ml15 (1988) (spouses significantly overestimated patients'
preferences in three of six illness scenarios); Nancy R. Zweibel & Christine K. Cassel, Treatment Choices
at the End of Life: A Comparison of Decisions By Older Patients and their Physician-Selected Proxies,
29 GERONTOLOGIST 615, 618 table 2 (1989) (proportion of instances where patient wanted the opposite
of what their proxies predicted ranged from 24% for tube feeding to 50% for chemotherapy). But see
Marion Danis et al., Patients' and Families' Preferences for Medical Intensive Care, 260 JAMA 797, 799
(1988) ("[f]amilies' preferences were similar to those of surviving patients").
21. The benefits versus burdens approach was first applied in Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal.
Rptr. 484 (Ct. App. 1983). The principal burdens considered by the courts include pain and indignity.
The principal benefit is continued quality of life. See MEISEL, supra note 10, §§ 9.27-.32. Quality of life,
however, was rejected as a factor in the leading benefits versus burdens case. In re Conroy, 486 A.2d
1209 (1985). The sole burden that the court was willing to consider was "recurring, unavoidable and
severe pain," id at 1232. The court later found it impossible to apply this standard when it was
presented with two cases involving patients in persistent vegetative states. See In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434
(N.J. 1987); In re Peter, 529 A.2d 419 (NJ. 1987).
22. In re Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840 (Ct. App. 1988).
23. Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hosp., 482 A.2d 713, 720-21 (Conn. 1984).
24. HASTINGS CENTER, GUIDELINES ON THE TERMINATION OF LiFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT AND
THE CARE OF THE DYING 28-29 (1987).
25. Lindgren, supra note 2, at 228-29.
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(1) permanently unconscious patients;
(2) terminally ill but conscious patients;
(3) patients suffering a great deal of physical pain; and
(4) patients with an illness that makes them totally dependent on a
family member or other person for their care.
Lindgren recognizes that polls have their limitations, and nowhere are those
limitations more obvious than with respect to category (4). Several million
individuals would currently appear to fit within that category. It might include
a sizeable portion of individuals with development disabilities, a substantial
minority, if not a majority of the elderly nursing home population, and a
significant number of the elderly who are cared for at home.26
Lindgren stands on far more solid ground when it comes to category (1). In
fact, if O'Connor and Cruzan are regarded as aberrations, Lindgren may have
already won the war. Although the theories by which they reach their result may
vary, the courts have not been hesitant to authorize withdrawal of treatment
from permanently unconscious patients. 27 A growing body of commentary
argues for the very presumption that Lindgren seeks. 8 Nontreatment appears
to be becoming the norm.
The more difficult questions are encountered when it comes to categories (2)
and (3). Poll data may suggest that terminally ill but conscious patients would
want treatment terminated, but the reliability of those polls as a predictor for
public policy is open to question. There is no agreement on what is meant by
a "terminal illness., 29  Furthermore, the average time between the onset of a
final illness and death is twenty-nine months.3 ° Is Lindgren suggesting that all
treatment be stopped upon the first diagnosis? Perhaps what he intends is that
treatment should be terminated if the patient has a "terminal illness" as defined
in most living will statutes, which require either that death be "imminent, 31 or
26. Approximately 1.5 million elderly Americans reside in nursing homes. More than 70% of them
are unable to perform three or more activities deemed essential for daily living, and a substantial
majority have one or more major psychiatric disorders. In 1985, over 60% of elderly with three or more
functional impairments did not reside in nursing homes. See David M. English, The Rights of Nursing
Home Patients, TR. & EST., July 1991, at 28.
27. Alan Meisel has catalogued 33 cases in which the courts have described the patient as being in
either a coma or persistent vegetative state. MEISEL, supra note 10, § 5.20. In only two of those
decisions was there a final denial by the court of a request to terminate treatment.
28. See, e.g., Charles H. Baron, Why Withdrawal of Life-Support for PVS Patients Is Not a Family
Decision, 19 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 73 (1991); Norman Cantor, The Permanently Unconscious
Patient, Non-Feeding and Euthanasia, 15 AM. J. LAW & MED. 381 (1989); Dresser & Robertson, supra
note 19.
29. The uncertainty is due in part to the fact that "the determination of the presence of terminal
illness is itself a question that involves an assessment of risk and a balancing of the benefits and burdens
of treatment that might reduce that risk." Sandra H. Johnson, Sequential Domination, Autonomy and
Living Wills, 9 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 113, 126 (1987).
30. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FORGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT: A
REPORT ON THE ETHICAL, MEDICAL, AND LEGAL ISSUES IN TREATMENT DECISIONS 18 (1983)
[hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION].
31. See Gregory Gelfand, Living Will Statutes: The First Decade, 1987 Wis. L. REv. 737, 741 n.9
& 744 n.17 (citing 16 living will statutes with "imminent death" requirement).
[Vol. 56: No. 3
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that death will occur within a "relatively short time., 32 Both definitions raise
interpretive questions, however, and would not provide the certainty that
Lindgren seeks.
33
An all-or-nothing rule for patients in extreme pain should also be rejected.
Pain can usually be controlled through medications. Even without medications,
the alleviation of pain is a concern in only a minority of cases.' It would seem
inappropriate to mandate termination of treatment for a symptom that may be
associated with inadequate care.
3 5
The cases on termination of treatment are often ambiguous, conflicting, and
each new opinion typically raises more questions than it answers. Although the
cases are subject to criticism, slotting patients into arbitrary categories and then
presuming that they would want treatment withheld or withdrawn is an approach
fraught with peril. Lindgren's proposal is attractive because it gives the
appearance of being a simple solution. But in this area of the law, there can be
no simple solutions.
32. See, e.g., UNIFORM RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL ACT § 1(9) (1989), 9B U.L.A. 98 (1992
Supp.).
33. "This [relatively short time] definition gives to the physician authority to answer a question that
is not entirely a matter of professional judgment. An individual's evaluation of a period of time as
'short' depends on the goals and values of that individual." Johnson, supra note 29, at 125-26. See also
Joanne Lynn, Why I Don't Have a Living Will, 19 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 101 (1991).
34. See generally PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 30, at 278-86.
35. For example, in one recent study, all of the patients with bed or pressure sores were found to
be severely malnourished. Gayle D. Pinchcofsky-Devin & Mitchell V. Kaminski, Jr., Correlation of
Pressure Sores and Nutritional Status, 34 J. AM. GERIATRICS Soc'Y 435 (1986).
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